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DIVIDENDS -INCOME OR CORPUS IN LIFE
ESTATES?
WILLIA],1 C. MACLEAN'
F OR years the dispute between life beneficiaries and
remaindermen to corporate dividends or distribu-
tions during a life interest has presented a problem to
the student of the law. The cash dividend so common in
early corporation finance received first consideration in
the courts. In later years, corporation finance evolved
many different types of dividends, other than the cash
dividend, and this development has caused a modifica-
tion, and, in some instances, has required a reversal of
the earlier decisions of the courts.
Dividends are a corporate profit set aside, declared,
and ordered by the directors to be paid to the stockhold-
ers on demand or at a fixed time. 2 In a technical, as
well as in an ordinary acceptation, dividends are that
portion of the profits which the corporation by its di-
rectors, sets apart for ratable division among its share-
holders. Until the dividend is actually declared by the
directors, these corporate profits belong to the corpora-
tion and not to the stockholders.3 Before being declared
as dividends, corporate profits are liable for the corpo-
rate indebtedness the same as other assets of the cor-
poration.4 Originally cash dividends were the most
common form of dividends, and for years the only type,
but corporation finance in its more recent development
has found justification for dividends payable in stock, in
bonds, in script, or in the property of the corporation.
When a corporation has profits which are not in the
form of money or cash, but are in the form of property,
1 Member of the Chicago Bar. Associated with Defrees, Buckingham,
Jones and Hoffman.
2 In re Wilson's Estate, 85 Ore. 604.
3 Mobile & 0. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486.
4 DeKoven v. Alsop, 205 Ill. 309.
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and the company wishes to anticipate the time when the
property may be or will be sold for cash and the cash
distributed by a money dividend, then a script dividend
is declared. Theoretically, a script dividend is a divi-
dend of certificates giving the holder certain rights which
are specified in the certificate itself. Sometimes the cer-
tificate entitles the holder to a sum of money payable
with interest at a certain time after date, or at the option
of the company, or even when the company shall have
sufficient surplus to pay the certificates in full.5 A script
dividend may be rescinded after declaration providing
no script has actually been issued." Frequently script
dividends are issued because a corporation cannot issue
additional capital stock, the entire capital stock being
already issued; sometimes they are issued to avoid taxes,
and in many instances to increase the transferable in-
terests without conferring upon the holder of the inter-
est any voting power. It is possible, therefore, for script
dividends to be practically the same as shares of stock,
except, however, that the script has no voting power.
7
A property dividend is, as the name implies, a division
of the property of the corporation. For example, where
a company has in its treasury, stock in another company,
and distributes it among its stockholders, then such a
dividend is a property dividend." A dividend or distribu-
tion of the company's bonds among its stockholders is a
property dividend providing the value of the corporation
stock is not thereby impaired after the corporate debts
are deducted from the assets.9
Stock dividends are dividends of the stock of the cor-
poration. Such a dividend is legal providing an equiva-
lent amount of profits are permanently added to the
corporate property. Improvements of the corporate
property or extensions of the business from the earned
5 In re Robinson's Trust, 218 Pa. 481.
6 Staats v. Biograph Co., 236 Fed. 454.
7 Commonwealth v. Union Traction Co., 192 Pa. St. 507.
8 Allegheny v. Pittsburg, A. & M. P. Ry. Co., 179 Pa. St. 414.
9 In re De Soto Coal Mining & Development Co., 218 Fed. 892.
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profits are frequently the basis for declaring stock divi-
dends. 10 Although many believe it so, a stock dividend is
not a withdrawal of the assets of the corporation-the
stockholders own identically the same aliquot proportion
of the assets as formerly. The stockholders actually
gain nothing, and the corporation parts with nothing.
The function of a stock dividend is to place in the hands
of the stockholders an instrument whereby they can con-
veniently detract from the value of the shares of stock
which they formerly held in order to vest new and equal
rights in the person or persons to whom they might
transfer the new shares of stock. Whatever of value
passes to the purchasers of those new shares is with-
drawn, not from the assets of the company itself, but
from the antecedent equity or interest which is vested in
the stockholders making the particular sale. 1 Some
states regulate stock dividends by constitution. The
Illinois Constitution contains a restriction upon stock
dividends of railroads.
12
Where an estate holds shares of stock and the income
from the shares of stock is to go to the life tenant and
the remainder to another party, it is often a perplexing
and difficult problem whether the life tenant or the re-
mainderman is entitled to the stock dividends or the un-
usual and extraordinary cash dividends. Courts of dif-
ferent jurisdictions have differed in the application of
the rules governing this subject. In general there are
three well defined rules or theories for the proper treat-
ment of the distribution of corporate dividends or dis-
tributions during the life interest. These rules are
known as the American or Pennsylvania rule, the Massa-
chusetts rule, and the English rule.
Since the Pennsylvania rule prevails in nearly every
state in the Union, it has been denominated the American
rule. This rule proceeds upon the theory that the court,
in disposing of stock or property or unusual cash divi-
10 Aisop v. DeKoven, 205 Ill. 309.
11 Great Western Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 198 U. S. 561.
12 Constitution of 1870, Art. XI, sec. 13.
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dends, as between life tenant and remaindermen, may
properly inquire as to the time when the fund out of
which the extraordinary dividend is to be paid was
earned or accumulated, and also as to the method of
accumulation. In case it is found to have accrued or
been earned before the life estate arose, it may be held
to be principal, and, without reference to the time when
it is declared or made payable, to belong to the corpus
of the estate, and not to go to the life tenant. But when
it is found that the fund, out of which the extra divi-
dend is paid, accrued or was earned, not before, but after
the life estate arose, then it may be held to be income
and belong to the tenant for life. This equitable rule
prevails not only in Pennsylvania where it was first de-
clared, but also in California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
In the absence of a contrary provision by statute, or
in the will or other instrument creating the life interest,
ordinary current dividends are payable, without appor-
tionment, to the life beneficiary, if declared during the
continuance of the life interest, and to the remainder-
man if declared before the commencement or after the
termination of the life interest.
The intervals between the time of payment of ordi-
nary cash dividends on stock are so brief, and the sums
divided so small, that no great injustice can be done in
denying apportionment. Difficulty in ascertaining the
exact amount of profit made during fractions of a divi-
dend period makes apportionment impracticable,"3 and
the fact that the chance that the life tenant may benefit
from earnings that accrued before the testator's death is
in the long run balanced by the chance that the re-
mainderman may benefit from earnings that accrued dur-
ing the life tenancy.
14
13 Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368.
14 In re McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78.
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In In re Brandreth's Estate,15 where a dividend was
declared by a corporation on the 24th of November, and
the person entitled to the dividends for life had died
on the preceding 15th of November, and the last pre-
ceding dividend was declared on the 28th of October of
the same year, it was held that the November dividend
was not apportionable between the estate of the life
tenant and those entitled in remainder under the New
York Code Civ. Proc., sec. 2720, providing for the ap-
portionment of "annuities, dividends, and other pay-
ments of every description, made payable or becoming
due at fixed periods," notwithstanding that the corpora-
tion endeavored to pay dividends monthly; since such
payments are dependent upon the amount of the earn-
ings, and are subject to the power of the executive com-
mittee to increase or diminish them at its pleasure or
convenience. And in Waterman's Estate,16 ordinary
dividends declared by a coal company, because the mines
were opened during the lifetime of the testator, the court
held belonged to the life tenant even though every divi-
dend paid out by the company from money realized from
the sale of coal mined, to a certain extent, diminished
the assets which make up the value of the capital estate.
The intention of the testator, however, may alter the
rule. Where the provisions in the will provided for ap-
portionment and the parties in interest agreed upon the
division, an apportionment of ordinary current cash divi-
dends was upheld.17
The rule with regard to extraordinary distributions
or dividends rejects the character of the dividend as a
cash or a stock dividend as the criterion in determin-
ing the rights of the parties. On the other hand it in-
quires as to the time, relative to the commencement
of the life estate, covered by the accumulations of earn-
ings from which payment of the extraordinary dividend,
whether stock or cash, was made. So far as it is sus-
15 72 N. Y. Supp. 333.
16279 Pa. 491.
17 In re Barron's Will, 163 Wis. 275.
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ceptible to practical operation this rule more nearly
approximates justice between the parties in the treat-
ment of this type of dividends.
The doctrine of apportionment of extraordinary divi-
dends between the life tenant and remainderman was
first enunciated in Earp's Appeal.' Although such divi-
dends are presumably payable to the party entitled to
the income at the time the dividend is declared, yet this
presumption will yield to proof of the facts. Where by
an extraordinary dividend the corporate assets are re-
duced below their value at the time the trust began, then
the principal must be reimbursed before anything is
awarded to income. 19 An apportionment of dividends is
directed by the courts to preserve the integrity of the
trust fund.20  The burden, however, of showing the
necessity of apportionment is placed upon the remain-
derman.2'
New York rejected the doctrine of apportionment in
In re Kernochan,22 and it was not until fifteen years
later that it accepted the Pennsylvania rule.23 In In re
Osborne,24 the majority opinion of the court distin-
guished that case from the earlier cases which either
repudiated or at least refused to apply the principle of
apportionment. In its opinion the court said:
In determining who is entitled to a dividend upon stock held
in trust, the intention of the testator or the maker of the trust
must be carried out, when such intent is clear, so far as such
intent does not result in an unlawful accumulation of income.
Very many cases arise, however, where the testator or maker
of the trust had not considered the possibility of enormous divi-
dends being declared by corporations to effectuate their reorgan-
ization or in the division of accumulated profits, made necessary
Is 28 Pa. St. 368.
19 McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78.
20 In re Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450.
21 Boyer's Appeal, 224 Pa. 144.
22 104 N. Y. 618.
23 In re Harteau, 204 N. Y. 292.
24 209 N. Y. 450.
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by new statutes, changed circumstances, and modern rules and
conditions, or, if such testator or maker of the trust had con-
sidered such possibility, he failed to express himself in the
instrument creating the trust so as to show any clear intention
regarding the same. . . . Notwithstanding the difficulty
in many cases of apportioning dividends, it is wiser and better
to leave an apportionment to courts of equity, in preference
to adhering to a rule that depends more upon its simplicity and
convenience of enforcement than upon justice and right. The
distinction between ordinary and extraordinary dividends is
necessary to make a workable rule, and at the same time preserve
the integrity of the trust fund. The integrity of the trust fund
and the rights of the life beneficiary under the trust should
each be considered, determined, and preserved by a court of
equity.
New York consistently followed the decision as an-
nounced in the above mentioned case but in 1926 in
People ex rel. Clark v. Gilchrist,5 the Court of Appeals
assigned the difficulties and complexities which the courts
experienced in the practical application of the Pennsyl-
vania rule as reasons for the adoption of the act of the
New York Legislature in amending the Personal Prop-
erty law. Justice Cardozo in speaking for the court said
in part:
The same Legislature that excluded stock dividends from the
category of income for the purpose of taxation went farther,
and amended the Personal Property Law by enacting that,
under any will or deed hereafter made, unless otherwise therein
.provided, stock dividends shall be principal, and not income
of a trust. The rule previously applied had resulted in so
many complications and obscurities as to be almost unworkable
in practice. It involved elaborate accountings for the purpose
of determining how far the dividends were the result of profits
accumulated before the creation of the trust, and how far the
result of profits accumulated thereafter. The Legislature
evinced its will that there should be an end to these complexities
hereafter in the administration of the law of trusts.
25 243 N. Y. 173.
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Although the statute does not in terms or by direct effect
substitute the Massachusetts rule for the Pennsylvania
rule as regards extraordinary cash dividends, it is not
improbable that the courts of New York, without the aid
of an explicit statute in that regard, will adopt the other
branch of the Massachusetts rule, and award cash divi-
dends to the life tenant, regardless of the period of
accumulation of the earnings from which they are de-
clared. In that event the result, so far as extraordinary
cash dividends are concerned, will be the same as that
which, prior to the adoption of the Pennsylvania rule in
the Osborne case, prevailed in New York. The New York
statute, by express terms, is applicable only to trusts
thereafter created, and not even then if a contrary in-
tention is indicated by the will or other trust instru-
ment. It will undoubtedly be several years before a de-
cision will be available under the new statute. The at-
tention of the reader is called to the case of In re Nor-
ton's Will2 6 in 1927 where the rule of the Osborne case
was followed.
The court in In re Waterman's Estate27 awarded a divi-
dend, which distributed to each stockholder in specie a
proportionate part of Liberty Loan bonds purchased
from profits wholly accumulated during the testator's
lifetime, to the corpus of the estate. And in Bourne v.
Bourne28 the stock in a subsidiary corporation acquired
by the parent corporation from its surplus accumulated
prior to the testator's death was awarded to the re-
mainderman. And we find that subscription privileges
are an incident belonging to stock in the corpus of the
estate, and therefore pertain to capital and belong to the
remainderman regardless of whether such privilege is a
so-called right or a mere option.29
Although the general rule is that dividends represent-
ing the proceeds of a sale of the capital assets belong to
26 224 N. Y. Supp. 77.
27 279 Pa. 491.
28 240 N. Y. 172.
29 Sturgis v. Roche, 204 N. Y. Supp. 859.
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the remainderman, there is an exception in Matter of
Accounting of Ithaca Trust Compay 30 where the cor.
poration contemplated such dividends as the primary
source of income and obtained the proceeds in the ordi-
nary course of its business. The corporation was formed
for the purpose of buying, selling, managing, and own-
ing lands and for cultivating the lands and marketing
their products. The primary source of income contem-
plated was the profits arising from the sales of lands at
an increase over their cost. The dividends in this case
were paid to the trustee over the period of the life es-
tate, but the trustee allotted only a portion to the life
tenant. The court said that the testator, before his
death, had received many large dividends from the sale
of lands, and that during his life no charges had been
made in the principal's account of the corporation by
reason of these dividends, but that they had been paid
from profit and loss, and that the same procedure was
continued during the life tenancy, at the close of which
the corporation emerged with its capital investment un-
impaired, and with a residuum of capital assets largely
exceeding in value the capital assets as they stood at
the beginning of the period. The court observed that it
was no answer to this to say that it was a practice of
the company to denominate receipts from sales of land
as "principal" for such purpose, the classification
adopted by the company's treasurer when he sent out
the dividend checks or a tax report of the company not
being decisive.
In In re Eisner's Estate"' the court discussed fully the
question of whether rights on stock are income or cap-
ital. The case follows what appears to be the general
rule, regarding rights to subscribe to additional capital
stock in the same corporation as a part of the corpus.
In discussing the privilege of subscribing to stock in
.30 237 N. Y. 577.
31 175 Pa. St. 120.
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another corporation the court held that the profit de-
rived from the right to subscribe belonged to the tenant
for life, rather than the remainderman. This is men-
tioned specifically in view of the decision in Sturgis v.
Roche, ' wherein the New York court held the right per-
tained to capital and hence belonged to the corpus.
Of the jurisdictions committed to the Pennsylvania
rule, the courts of Pennsylvania and New York have
stated and explained most clearly the basis of appor-
tionment in case the extraordinary dividend from earn-
ings, whether stock or cash, was earned partly before
and partly after the commencement of the life interest.
The fundamental principle underlying the Pennsylvania
rule is the time when the dividend was earned, relative
to the commencement of the life interest. Yet, it should
be remembered, that the time when the dividend was
earned is the same whether the dividend is in cash or in
stock. Another point, however, to be considered is that,
while a cash dividend of a given per cent may properly
be treated as earned during the life interest if the sur-
plus or undivided earnings which have accumulated dur-
ing the life interest equal or exceed that per cent of
the capital stock of the corporation provided there has
been no impairment of the book or intrinsic value of the
stock as of the commencement of the life interest, yet
this does not necessarily follow as to a stock dividend,
since the new shares will participate in the capital assets
and the surplus or undivided earnings that had accumu-
lated before the commencement of the life interest. Quite
properly it would seem that the stock dividend cannot
properly be regarded as earned during the life interest
unless the surplus or undivided earnings which accumu-
lated during that period have been sufficient to make the
book value of the shares, both old and new, equal to or
in excess of the book value of the shares as of the time
of the commencement of the life interest.
32 204 N. Y. Supp. 859.
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Mr. Justice Clark in speaking for the court in Appeal
of Smith33 said:
It is well settled in this state that, when the stock of a corpo-
ration is by the will of a decedent given in trust, the incomes
thereof for the use of a beneficiary for life, with remainder over,
the surplus profits which have accumulated in the lifetime of
the testator, but which are not divided until after his death,
belong to the corpus of his estate; while the dividends of earn-
ings made after his death are* income, and are payable to the
life tenant no matter whether the dividend be in cash or script
of stock.
The facts in Earp's Appeal3 4 are interesting and can
well be stated at this point. Robert Earp died November
17, 1848. He then had 580 shares of stock in a manu-
facturing corporation, which were worth at that time,
including the accumulated surplus, $125 per share. This
value was ascertained by an actual sale of 40 shares at
that price, leaving the estate possessed of 540 shares.
The surplus fund continued to increase for six years
until 1854, when, instead of dividing the surplus in money
among the stockholders, they were given a dividend of
150 per cent of their holdings in new certificates of stock.
The estate received 810 shares of new stock bringing
the total holdings up to 1,350 shares. At the testator's
death, the 540 shares which he owned were worth at
$125 per share, the sum of $67,500. When the stock
dividend was declared, the market value of the shares
fell to $80 per share and the 1,350 shares were then
worth, the sum of $108,000. The court held that the dif-
ference in value, $40,500, represented the amount of
profit arising or accruing upon the stock after the death
of the testator, and as such was all awarded to the life
tenants. The estate received a sufficient number of
shares valued at $80 per share to make the value of the
estate equal the value at the date of the testator's death.
33 140 Pa. St. 344.
34 28 Pa. St. 368.
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The method of determining the value of the stock at
the time of the testator's death as used in Earp's Appeal
was commented upon in In re Stokes' Estate,35 where
the court quoted from Moss' Appeal"3 in its opinion:
The fallacy of this theory consists in the fact of estimating the
one hundred and forty shares, not at their actual value at the
time of the transaction, but at their market value, three years
afterwards. A more uncertain rule could not well be imagined.
It would make the rights of the parties depend upon the con-
dition of the stock market, which is as variable as the tides,
without their regularity. Market values are well enough upon
a question of distribution, where the parties are about to realize;
but upon the question of values between the life tenants and
the remaindermen, a judicial decree must go down through the
shifting sands of the stock market until it reaches the solid
rock of actual values. The application of any other rule might
work serious injustice. It is well known that within the last
year the stock of more than one large corporation has varied
in price over 100 per cent.
In the case of In re Osborne,37 on a motion to amend
the remittitur, the New York court practically followed
the opinion of the Pennsylvania court in the Stokes case.
In both cases the underlying principle is not the division
of the dividend stock or cash between the corpus or
income in the proportions of the amounts of earnings
that accumulated before, and the amount that accumu-
lated after, the stock became subject to the life interest,
but merely the compensation of the corpus for the
diminution, in consequence of the dividend, of the in-
trinsic values of the shares as of the time they became
subject to the life interest. The court in granting the
motion to amend the remittitur said:
The intrinsic value of the trust investment is to be ascertained
by dividing the capital and the surplus of the corporation exist-
ing at the time of the creation of the trust by the number of
35 240 Pa. 277.
36 83 Pa. St. 264.
37 209 N. Y. 450.
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shares of the corporation then outstanding, which gives the value
of each share, and that amount must be multiplied by the num-
ber of shares held in the trust. The value of the investment
represented by the original shares after the dividend has been
made is ascertained by exactly the same method. The difference
between the two shows the impairment of the corpus of the
trust. . . . If the dividend is in stock, the amount of
impairment in money must be divided by the intrinsic value
of a share of the new stock, and the quotient gives the number
of shares to be retained to make the impairment good; the
remaining shares going to the life beneficiary. Market value,
good will, and the like considerations cannot be considered in
apportioning a dividend.
The court in Lang v. Lang's Executors3s considered that
undivided earnings although not carried to the surplus
account give value to the stock and form a part of the
capital of the testator's estate. Although the presump-
tion is that dividends are earned at a uniform rate day
by day, this may be rebutted. The dividend in the Lang
case, although unusual in amount, was assumed to have
been paid from earnings of the fiscal year during which
the testator died, and hence was not an extraordinary
dividend in the sense in which the term has been used
generally heretofore in this paper.
In Ballantine v. Young,39 the stockholders were given
the right to subscribe for two new shares of stock at
par for every old share held. Contemporaneously a spe-
cial cash dividend of 200 per cent was declared. The
trustees took the cash dividend and used it to pay for
the new stock and naturally the question arose as to who
is entitled to the dividend. In discussing the case the
court states:
Is this an ordinary or an extraordinary dividend? It seems
to be extraordinary for three reasons: (1) It was declared in
addition to the regular dividend; (2) it was much larger, ex-
ceeding the net profits made in the preceding year; and (3) it
38 57 N. J. Eq. 325.
39 79 N. J. Eq. 70.
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was evidently made for the special purpose of enabling the
stockholders to avail themselves of the new subscription.
I, therefore, think . . . that the dividend is apportionable
between principal and income in the ratio that the surplus at
the testator's death bears to the surplus accumulated there-
after up to the time the dividend was declared.
From an accurate accounting basis it would seem that
the book or intrinsic value after a stock dividend, for
purpose of comparison with the book or intrinsic value
as of the date of the commencement of the life interest,
should exclude any appreciation in the value of the cap-
ital assets that may have taken place during the con-
tinuance of the life interest. Quite frequently industrial
engineers make new appraisals of the capital assets
with the result that the new values placed upon those as-
sets after the appraisal exceed the values placed upon
the same assets before the appraisal. In such case, if
the appreciation in the values is reflected in the book
value, then an adjustment should be made so that the
parties remain in relatively the same position as for-
merly in respect to the intrinsic value of the shares
which may reasonably be traced to income after the com-
mencement of the life interest.
There are a few cases in the reports in jurisdictions
committed to the Pennsylvania rule where the entire
stock dividend has been awarded to income and no ap-
portionment has been made. For example in Appeal of
Philadelphia Trust, Safe Deposit &, Ins. Co.,40 In re
Baldwin, 41 and Ashurst v. Potter 2 the reason is at-
tributable directly to the fact that the stock dividend was
earned entirely after the commencement of and during
the life interest.
Under the Pennsylvania rule the following conclusions
may be drawn:
1. The entire amount of an extraordinary cash divi-
40 16 AtI. 734 (Pa. Sup.).
41 209 N. Y. 601.
42 29 N. J. Eq. 625.
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dend, declared during the life interest, from corporate
earnings that accumulated during the life interest, goes
to income.
2. The entire amount of an extraordinary cash divi-
dend, declared during the life interest, from corporate
earnings that accumulated wholly before the commence-
ment of the life interest, goes to corpus.
3. The entire amount of an extraordinary cash divi-
dend, declared during the life interest, from earnings
which accumulated partly before and partly after the
commencement of the life interest, is apportioned be-
tween corpus and income in such a way as to compensate
corpus for the loss, because of that dividend, of the in-
trinsic or book value of the shares as of the date that
they became subject to the life interest.
4. A stock dividend, declared during the life interest,
which was earned wholly during the life interest and
which does not reduce the intrinsic value of the original
shares as of the date they became subject to the life in-
terest, goes entirely to income.
5. A stock dividend, declared during the life inter-
est, which was earned wholly before the commencement
of the life interest, goes entirely to corpus.
6. A stock dividend, declared during the life interest,
which was earned partly before and partly during the
life interest, is apportioned in such a way as to com-
pensate corpus for the loss, in consequence of the divi-
dend, of the intrinsic or book value of the original shares
as of the date they became subject to the life interest.
7. Intrinsic or book values of the stock rather than
the market values are the controlling factors in deter-
mining whether there has been impairment of the corpus
of the stock as it stood at the date the shares became
subject to the life interest.
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The Massachusetts rule was stated in Minot v. Paine
and Others43 as "a simple rule is to regard cash divi-
dends, however large, as income, and stock dividends,
however made, as capital." In subsequent cases, the rule
has been affirmed and elaborated. Many writers, how-
ever, believe that this rule works great hardship and
injustice in many cases. The rule, therefore, is not rig-
idly adhered to; and the courts, in deciding whether the
distribution is a stock or a cash dividend, may consider
the actual and substantial character of the transaction
and not merely its nominal character. This rule pre-
vails generally in Georgia, Rhode Island, and Illinois
in addition to Massachusetts.
As early as 1839, the estate was denied any share in
a cash dividend declared in April following the tes-
tatrix's death in January.44 The last dividend received
by the testatrix was in the October preceding her death.
The court based its decision upon the ground that the
dividend was incapable of apportionment.
As regards ordinary current dividends, the Massa-
chusetts rule is much the same as the Pennsylvania or
American rule. Almost without exception, unless the ex-
press language of the will provides a different result,
the ordinary current dividends are given to the life ten-
ant or beneficiary-if declared during the continuance
of the life interest, and to the remainderman-if declared
before or after the termination of the life interest.
Dividends, according to the general rule, belong to the
owner of the shares at the time the dividend is declared
and not to the owner at the time of payment. How-
ever, in Nutter v. Andrews, 5 the court drew a distinction
between a case where the resolution declaring the divi-
dend merely postpones the time of the payment and
where it specifies the time and manner for determining
the stockholders entitled to receive the dividend. There
43 99 Mass. 101.
44 Foote, Appellant, etc., 22 Pick. 299.
45 246 Mass. 224.
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it was concluded that the rights of the estate of a life
beneficiary should be determined by the effect of the
vote to the same extent as if the beneficiary had been
stockholder of record, and the dividends should be paid
to the residuary legatee and not to the estate of the life
tenant. This case also held that payments which the
lessee of the corporation made directly to the stock-
holders of the corporation instead of to the corporation
itself-for convenience-constitute dividends within the
rule of ordinary current dividends not apportionable in
case of the death of the life beneficiary between dividend
periods.
That the majority of the Massachusetts rule cases
refer to the action of the corporation as controlling is
no doubt caused primarily by the fact that the instru-
ment creating the trust had not manifested the explicit
intention of the testator as to whether the particular
distribution in the form of unusual stock or unusual cash
dividends should be regarded as income or corpus, or
should be apportioned between the two. It is extremely
difficult for the maker of a will to foresee all possible
contingencies, and to provide in each particular instance
what shall be income and what shall be corpus. There-
fore, it should be remembered at the outset that this
particular rule, like all other rules upon the subject,
appears to have been adopted as the rule in respect to
dividends and other distributions when the creator of
the trust did not anticipate or provide. In Massachusetts
and in those jurisdictions adopting the rule, the inten-
tion of the corporation, not as to the respective rights
of the parties but as to the nature of the distribution or
declaration of the rights of the shareholders-whether
it amounts to cash or a stock dividend, a capitalization
of assets, or a distribution of earnings-is practically
controlling. In Mivot v. Paine, the court said the follow-
ing regarding the stock dividend:
It is obvious that, if the directors had made no stock dividend,
but had invested the income in permanent improvements, mak-
ing no increase in the number of shares, the improvements
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would have been capital, belonging to the legatees in remain-
der. So, if they had thus invested it, and, instead of increasing
the number of shares, had increased their par value, the shares
would have been mere capital, and not income, as to the share-
holders, though increased in value by the application of the net
income of the road to that purpose. So, when they increased
the number of shares, each share of all the stock in the cor-
poration is in its nature capital. The new shares take their
place among the old ones; and each of the old shares thereby
becomes a less proportion of the whole stock than it was before,
and is entitled to a less proportion of dividends declared than
it was before. It may be that dividends are less per cent than
they would otherwise have been, and in such case the old stock
is diminished in value, and the interest of the remaindermen
is injuriously affected. But, on the other hand, the effect may
be, by increasing the business of the road, to increase the divi-
dends and the market value of the old stock. But neither courts
nor trustees can investigate such matters with accuracy; and in
many cases no investigation can be made. A trustee needs some
plain principle to guide him; and the cestuis que trust ought
not to be subjected to the expense of going behind the action
of the directors, and investigating the concerns of the corpo-
ration, especially if it is out of our jurisdiction. A simple rule
is, to regard cash dividends, however large, as income, and
stock dividends, however made, as capital. The court are of
opinion that this rule is more in conformity with the legal and
equitable rights of shareholders than any other that has been
suggested. It is also in conformity with the decisions of the
court, so far as the subject has been considered.
Ordinarily the United States Supreme Court follows
the law of the state from which the case was appealed in
its decisions. The case of Gibbons v. MahoiV0 came
before the court from the District of Columbia, so the
question presented was clearly one for the independent
decision of the higher court, unaffected by any duty to
follow a state rule upon the subject. The court used
46 136 U. S. 549.
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
this language in supporting its adoption of the Massa-
chusetts rule:
Whether the gains and profits of a corporation should be so
invested and apportioned as to increase the value of each share
of stock for the benefit of all persons interested in it, either
for a term of life or of years, or by way of remainder in fee,
or should be distributed and paid out as income to the tenant
for life or for years, excluding the remainderman from any
participation therein, is a question to be determined by the
action of the corporation itself, at such times and in such man-
ner as the fair and honest administration of its whole property
and business may require or permit, and by a rule applicable
to all holders of like shares of its stock; and cannot, without
producing great embarrassment and inconvenience, be left open
to be tried and determined by the courts, as often as it may
be litigated between the persons claiming successive interests
under a trust created by the will of a single shareholder, and
by a distinct and separate investigation, through a master in
chancery or otherwise, of the affairs and accounts of the corpo-
ration, as of the dates when the provisions of the will of that
shareholder take effect, and with regard to his shares only. In
ascertaining the rights of such persons, the intention of the
testator, so far as manifested by him, must of course control;
but when he has given no special direction upon the question
as to what shall be considered principle and what income, he
must be presumed to have had in view the lawful power of the
corporation over the use and apportionment of its earnings,
and to have intended that the determination of the question
should depend upon the regular action of the corporation with
regard to all its shares.
In Gardiner v. Gardinere7 the trustees with the consent
of the necessary number of shareholders voted to issue
new preferred shares "in payment of the dividend
arrears on the preferred shares now outstanding." Some
of the new preferred shares were issued to a trustee
under a will which, among other things, provided for the
payment of the income of the trust fund to certain bene-
47 212 Mass. 508.
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ficiaries for life. In awarding the dividend to corpus,
Justice Braley said:
It is the substance, however, and not the technical form of the
transaction which determines the result. If the vote can be
interpreted as a voluntary recognition of the preferred share-
holders' contractual rights, which might not be enforced until
the winding up of the association, even then it was not intended
as a distribution of the salable shares based upon actual earn-
ings. The capitalization had been deliberately increased as there
were no profits for division, and if the financial outlook at the
time had improved, a surplus of future net earnings sufficient
to meet the outlay could not have been reasonably anticipated.
After the enlargement of the permanent capital the
property of the association neither had been increased nor
diminished, and the preferred shareholders when the new shares
will have been issued will represent according to their holdings
the same proportional preferences, which in the event of liqui-
dation entitles them to priority over the common shareholders.
In Coolidge v. Grant45 a corporation earned but passed,
or paid the preferred stock dividends in part, because
of a desire "to conserve the company's resources." To
adjust the payment of overdue dividends the corporation
gave the shareholders the option of accepting a "stock
dividend." The court followed the rule laid down in
the Gardiner case and in Mills v. Britto 9 and awarded
the dividend to the principal of the trust.
The facts in Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company
v. Adams50 were slightly different, and the dividend was
awarded to the tenant for life. A dividend was declared
and paid out of the accumulated surplus of net profits
or undivided earnings and issued in the form of corpo-
rate notes representing the arrears of past cumulative
dividends which might have been previously declared.
Again the action of the corporation was controlling for
the court held that a dividend declared and paid out of
48 251 Mass. 352.
49 64 Conn. 4.
50 219 Mass. 175.
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earnings or the accumulated surplus of net profits had
the features of a dividend from earnings and therefore
should be awarded as income to the left tenant.
The benefit of a right given by a corporation to its
stockholders to subscribe at par or at any other fixed
amount less than the book or intrinsic value, for a new
issue of its own stock, whether sold or exercised is
awarded to the remainderman. 5 1 In Davis v. Jacks on52
Justice Holmes in speaking for the court said "if the
trustees had sold their rights the proceeds would have
represented the detriment to the old shares caused by
the issue of new ones, and would have belonged to cap-
ital." In Hyde v. Holines,51 it was said that the rule
had no practical application because the trustees had
cash funds on hand when the cash dividend was declared
and the stock rights attached to the stock when the stock
was increased. Cash dividends were invested and the
court ruled that the new stock be held in trust for the
benefit of the trust, subject to the duty to pay over to
the life tenant the amount of the cash dividends which
had been invested therein. An excellent statement of
the general rule was given by Justice Knowlton and is
quoted in part:
We are of the opinion that the value of rights to subscribe for
an increase of stock, to be issued by a corporation
must be treated as property capitalized by the corporation. The
value of the new stock is made up of the par value which is
paid in by the subscriber, and an additional sum equal to the
difference between the par value and its market value. This
additional sum inheres in the new stock to be issued, and is a
part of the capital of the corporation. It cannot be used or
availed of otherwise than as a mere right or privilege, except
in connection with the ownership of the new stock, which is
capital.
Although the Massachusetts court held that a stock
right was income for the purposes of the state income
51 Atkins v. Albree and another, 94 Mass. 359.
52 152 Mass. 58.
53 198 Mass. 287.
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tax amendment, yet it did not assume to overrule its
established decisions that such a right was capital and
not income as between the life tenant and the remain-
derman.
Distributions of the corporation in the form of execu-
tory promises, like bonds, notes, or certificates of indebt-
edness-when absolute in their obligation and not
conditional-are regarded as cash dividends when made
from earnings and when they do not represent capital
assets. Courts take the point of view that payment in
executory obligations rather than in money must be
treated as a mere matter of convenience to the corpo-
ration-an option upon which the directors may decide
at will.54 The fact that an extra bank dividend was de-
clared payable in a certificate of deposit is therefore
immaterial. Such a dividend is substantially a cash
dividend to be credited to the stockholder upon the books
of the bank, and it is no longer the property of the bank.55
The court in the case of Millen et al. v. Guerrard et al.5
allowed certificates of indebtedness, in addition to the
regular cash dividends, of forty dollars per share to
be awarded to the life tenant. It was not apparent
whether the earnings, which were used in improvements
of the company's property and formed the basis of the
dividend, were made prior or subsequent to the testa-
trix's death. The court in its argument said, "Bonds
of the company, or promissory notes of it, or certificates
of indebtedness by it, are not accretions to its stock,
nor in any legal sense a part of its corpus. Indeed, they
are just the opposite."
The court in D'Ooge v. Leeds57 allowed to the remain-
derman as a part of the corpus, "bonds" containing no
binding obligation to pay any amount, but merely giving
the holder a contingent right to be paid out of the secu-
rities which had previously been held by the company in
54 Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Adams, 219 Mass. 175.
55 Humphrey et al. v. Lang et al., 169 N. C. 601.
56 67 Ga. 284.
57 176 Mass. 558.
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the surplus fund. The court in commenting upon the
action of the company-Adams Express Company, a
joint stock association-said:
If this company had been a corporation, and had wished to
make a dividend of preferred stock to its shareholders, it would
have done it in just this way. There has been no dividend of
any money or property among the shareholders. There has been
merely a change in the form of ownership in the property by
dividing it into two classes, and by making a different provision
in regard to dividends for each class, and by giving one class
a .preference over the other in its right to the assets on final
liquidation. . . . That the principal represented by the
so-called "bonds" is to remain in the company, and to be used
as capital, is too plain for discussion. The bonds give only a
contingent, equitable interest in certain property of the com-
pany. . . . The very nature of the bonds presupposes that,
as an investment, they are to be as permanent as the capital
stock of the company, for by their terms they cannot be paid
until the debts of the company are all provided for.
It was a more formal capitalization of earnings which pre-
viously had been capitalized in substance and effect.
Where a corporation sells the major portion of its
plant, equipment, and stock on hand and retains only sub-
sidiary properties which it plans to operate subsequently,
and receives in payment therefor from the purchasing
company the latter's stock and cash, all of which is dis-
tributed to the stockholders as a dividend, such stock
dividend represents in fact a partial liquidation and
distribution of the capital by the corporation and there-
fore belongs to the corpus.58 However, where a dividend
is in the stock of another corporation but represents an
investment of profits of the declaring corporation, rather
than a partial liquidation or distribution of the capital,
it is regarded as income belonging to the life tenant. 9
In Gray v. Hemenway, 0 an appeal was made to the
58 Mercer et ux. v. Buchanan et al., 132 Fed. 501.
59 Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Taintor, 85 Conn. 452.
60 223 Mass. 293.
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court to direct the disposition of a dividend of the Union
Pacific Railway Company. The Union Pacific declared a
dividend, partly in cash and partly in the stock of the
Baltimore and Ohio purchased from the Oregon Short
Line Railroad Company just before the declaration of
the dividend. The stock dividend was declared in con-
templation of the reduction of the regular dividend rate,
and the amount and character of the extra dividend was
determined with a view to compensate the stockholders
for the reduction. The directors expressly declared the
dividend to be out of surplus profits of the company,
and since the surplus assets of the Union Pacific were
more than sufficient to pay the entire dividend, it was
possible that the payment in fact be out of surplus. The
court held that the Baltimore and Ohio shares were a
part of the property of the Union Pacific used in its
business, as current assets, but were not permanently
capitalized, and therefore were available for dividends,
and as such belonged to the life tenant.
In Old Colony Trust Company v. Jameson et alY1 a
dividend on stock of the General Electric Company was
paid in stock of the Electric Bond and Share Securities
Corporation. The shares distributed as a dividend rep-
resented an investment of accumulated profits. Had the
directors sold the shares and divided the proceeds among
their stockholders, the dividend would have been a
proper cash dividend belonging to the life tenant. There-
fore, the court awarded the dividend as a cash dividend.
This is interesting, because the directors of the General
Electric Company intended the shares of the Electric
Bond and Share Corporation to be held as capital for
income tax purposes.
At a stockholders' meeting in the case of Davis v.
Jackson,62 an increase in the capital stock was voted and
the stockholders were permitted to take one new share for
every four held by them. At a meeting of the directors
held on the same day immediately following the stock-
61 256 Mass. 179.
62 152 Mass. 58.
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holders' meeting, an extra dividend of twenty-five dol-
lars per share was declared. This dividend was just
sufficient enough to enable the stockholders to pay for
their new stock if they so desired. The earnings of the
company were sufficient to pay the dividend; but if they
were used to pay the dividend, it was then necessary to
raise an amount to pay for additions made to capital,
and which had increased the value of the stock at least
25 per cent above the par value of the old stock. Justice
Holmes in awarding the dividend to the life tenant said
in part:
The dividend was declared as a cash dividend, and it repre-
sented what, originally at least, were earnings of the company.
In justice, the earnings of the company ought to go to the life
tenants. If the only thing to* be considered by the corporation
was the relation between tenants for life and remaindermen,
it would have no right to devote income to increasing capital.
If it wished to increase its plant, it would have to do it by
borrowing money or by issuing more stock. In fact, it has the
right to appropriate income to permanent improvements, because
it has a right to manage its affairs in the way it deems best
for them. But where the form of its transaction has not that
effect there is no reason why the courts should be astute to bring
it about. The remaindermen rely upon the fact that before
the dividend was declared, debts to an equal amount had been
incurred for permanent improvements. But the mere incurring
of a debt for capital, did not, of itself, amount to an appro-
priation to capital of all the income on hand. The corporation
was still free to choose how it would deal with its gains. When
it did choose it elected to distribute them.
The investment of the profits of a corporation in per-
manent work, improvements, or extensions does not ren-
der a cash dividend declared by the corporation out of
the proceeds of a sale of such improvements capital,
instead of income. Such dividend, being a cash dividend,
belongs to the life tenant and not to the remaindermen.6
3
63 Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543.
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The authority for the preceding statement made plain
the meaning of capital as used to determine the rights
of life tenant and remainderman. The word is to be
taken in its strict sense "to designate specifically the
fund, property, or other means contributed or agreed
to be contributed by the share owners as the financial
basis for the prosecution of the business of the corpora-
tion." The term capital has sometimes been used loosely
to indicate undistributed profits which have, in the dis-
cretion of the directors, been invested in permanent
works. But the use of profits in such a manner does not
alter the form of the assets; so the directors can, also
in their discretion, withdraw assets so utilized and return
them to their original form of surplus to be distributed
among stockholders as the directors might have chosen
to do in the first instance.
In Gray v. Hemenway,64 in an earlier case than the one
of the same name previously discussed, a dividend was
declared out of surplus of accumulated profits by the
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad in the form
of stock in the Lackawanna Company. The court
awarded the dividend to the life tenant and said in part:
The use made by the corporation of a part of its surplus fund
in taking shares of the stock of another company was, as we
have said, an investment rather than a capitalization thereof
by applying it upon the road or other permanent works of the
company itself. It was none the less an investment that doubt-
less was intended to be indirectly advantageous by allowing the
company to obtain a shorter line of railroad as well as directly
profitable from its capability of returning a fair income.
The decisive fact is that this was an investment rather than
a permanent application of the company's own property. It
remained in the control of the directors; and their action taken
in good faith in paying it out as a dividend to the stockholders
is not to be reviewed by us.
Stock dividends, although representing earnings in-
vested in improvements, are awarded to the remainder-
64212 Mass. 239.
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men without inquiring whether any part of the dividend
was earned after the death of the testator.6 5 Under the
Massachusetts rule declared in Minot v. Paine, and in
subsequent cases, the period covered by the accumulation
of the earnings is immaterial. The Massachusetts rule
was followed in Rhode Island in Brown & Lamed, Peti-
tioners,6  where a stock dividend was declared from
surplus.
The rule was again applied in Coolidge v. Grant67 by
awarding to corpus for the benefit of the remaindermen
all the shares of new preferred stock received by the
trustees pursuant to the action of the directors, who-in
order to adjust accumulated unpaid dividends on each
share of cumulative preferred stock--declared a dividend
in cash and also a stock dividend payable in cumulative
prior preference stock at par to such shareholders as
elected to receive it on named conditions. The vote to
pay this stock dividend was prefaced by a recital that
the company, after paying the cash dividend, would
"have a surplus in its profit and loss account in excess"
of the remaining overdue dividends "accumulated from
earnings and invested in real and personal property."
From the report it appears that the corporation earned
its dividends annually during the entire period of the
trust, but passed the dividends or paid them in part
because of a desire "to conserve the company's re-
sources." The court in its opinion said:
The dividend in the case at bar was avowed by the directors
in their vote to be a "stock dividend." There is no suspicion
that this avowal was not made in good faith. A declaration by
the officers of a corporation made honestly is entitled to great
weight in determining the nature of a dividend. It was in sub-
stance and effect precisely what the directors said it was. It
was the issuance of stock for full value in payment of an obli-
gation of the corporation. When issued it was on an equality
with all other stock of the same class. The amount of it became
at once capital to be continued in the business of the corporation.
65 Minot v. Paine and others, 99 Mass. 101.
66 14 R. I. 371.
67 251 Mass. 352.
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Under the Massachusetts rule the following conclusions
may be drawn:
1. The entire amount of an extraordinary cash divi-
dend, declared during the life interest from corporate
earnings that accumulated during the life interest, goes
to income.
2. The entire amount of an extraordinary cash divi-
dend, declared during the life interest from earnings
that accumulated wholly before the commencement of the
life interest, goes to income.
3. The entire amount of an extraordinary cash divi-
dend, declared during the life interest from earnings
which accumulated partly before the commencement and
partly after the commencement of the life interest, goes
to income.
4. A stock dividend which was earned wholly during
the life interest and which does not reduce the intrinsic
value of the original shares as of the date they became
subject to the life interest, goes entirely to corpus, when
declared during the life interest.
5. A stock dividend which was earned wholly before
the commencement of the life interest and was declared
during the life interest, goes entirely to corpus.
6. A stock dividend which was earned partly before
and partly during the life interest, goes entirely to cor-
pus, although declared during the life interest.
7. Dividends in the form of stock rights belong to
corpus.
8. Dividends in the form of script, bonds, or other
executory obligations, when absolute in their obligation
and not conditional, are regarded as cash dividends and
go entirely to income.
9. Dividends in the form of stock of other corpora-
tions representing a partial liquidation and distribution
of the capital of the company belong to corpus. When
the dividend represents an investment of profits of the
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declaring corporation it is regarded as income and goes
to the life tenant.
10. Dividends representing earnings invested in im-
provements go entirely to the life tenant as income.
Illinois adheres to the Massachusetts rule. In 1903
the case of DeKoven v. Alsop08 was decided by the Illi-
nois Supreme Court. Prior to that time there had been
no occasion for an extended opinion by our court upon
the subject of dividends in life estates, and little of
importance can be found in the reports. The question
for determination of the court in that case was whether
three classes of dividends should be considered income
or capital under the terms of the will. The first of these
classes of dividends was an extraordinary cash dividend
of twenty per cent upon the shares of stock of the Pull-
man Palace Car Company; the second class consisted of
the issue of certificates of stock known as "stock-divi-
dends;" and the third class consisted of certain rights
and privileges of subscribing to stock of five corpora-
tions. Because three unusual problems were presented
for the first time to the court, this case has long been
termed the leading case in Illinois upon this subject.
Mir. Justice Wilkin in the opinion of the court at the
outset relied upon Minot v. Paine, and followed the trend
of cases supporting the Massachusetts rule, and the three
classes of dividends were awarded in the following
manner: First, extraordinary cash dividends, declared
after the stockholder's death, consisting of money held
during his lifetime in the company's treasury as undi-
vided profits, was awarded to the life tenant as income.
Second, stock dividends which evidenced a conversion
by the corporation into capital of earnings accumulated
during the stockholder's lifetime, was awarded to the
remaindermen as a part of the corpus of the trust estate.
Third, funds derived by trustees from the "rights to
subscribe" for additional stock at par are part of the
trust estate in the original stock, held for the remainder-
68 205 Ill. 309.
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men after paying the "net income" to the life tenant,
whether the trustee subscribed to the stock or sold the
right to others.
Shortly after DeKoven v. Alsop was decided, the court
was again requested to pass upon the right to stock divi-
dends in Blinn v. Gillett69 and the DeKoven case was
cited and affirmed by the court. The court in its opinion
stated emphatically that the DeKoven case had carefully
considered all phases of the problem and unhesitatingly
adopted it.
The following year, 1905, another case involving the
right to a stock dividend was appealed to the Supreme
Court.70 Again Mr. Justice Wilkin affirmed the DeKoven
case by holding that as between the life tenant entitled
to the net income and the remaindermen entitled to the
principal of a trust estate invested in capital stock, a
stock dividend is part of the principal and goes to the
remaindermen. And so the DeKoven case was upheld
for the second time within two years and is the estab-
lished doctrine in this state.
The latest cases in Illinois upon this subject were de-
cided in December, 1930.71 A bill was filed in the Circuit
Court of Cook County to construe an indenture of trust
to determine whether a certain sum of money which
came into the hands of the trustees constituted net in-
come to the life beneficiary or belonged to the corpus
of the estate.
The trustees of the estate held in the trust among
other items of property 125 shares of stock of the
Tribune Company. The special charter issued to the
Tribune provided for purchase and holding of real estate.
In 1902 the company completed the erection of a build-
ing at the corner of Dearborn and Madison Streets in
Chicago. This building was disposed of in 1925 to a
corporation known as the Dearborn and Madison Build-
69 208 Ill. 473.
70 Billings v. Warren, 216 11. 281.
71 Lloyd v. Lloyd, 341 I1. 461.
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ing Corporation. In exchange for conveyance of the
building and leaseholds, the Tribune Company received
40,600 shares of stock in the Dearborn and Madison Cor-
poration, which were then distributed pro rata to the
stockholders of the Tribune. Stone and Keplinger then
purchased all these shares directly from the stockholders
at $100 per share, and the trustees in this case received
the sum of $255,750. Resolutions were adopted unani-
mously by both stockholders and directors of the Tribune
Company, providing that when a conveyance had been
consummated and the stock of the Dearborn and Madison
Building received by the Tribune Company, it should be
reissued to the stockholders of the Tribune Company
pro rata, according to their respective holdings, "as a
dividend . . . out of the last accumulated earnings
of this corporation." The court in its opinion again un-
qualifiedly reaffirmed the Massachusetts rule as the
established and logical law. The intention of the direc-
tors of the corporation is always given effect, under the
Massachusetts doctrine, and in this case the intent as
expressed by the resolution that the dividend should be
paid out of the last accumulated earnings. Quite prop-
erly the court decided that the dividend in this case
constituted income to the life beneficiaries under the
terms of the indenture of trust.
Although many students believe the Massachusetts rule
which is followed consistently by the court in Illinois
works great hardship and injustice in many cases, yet
the Pennsylvania rule requires elaborate accountings and
results in so many complications and obscurities that it
is almost unworkable in practice. Illinois will do well
to continue its consistent policy in this branch of the
law.
